

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To be returned to Mr. Warner

FROM THE OFFICE OF
SENATOR HENRY M. JACKSON
DEMOCRAT (WASHINGTON)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION OR
BROADCASTING PRIOR TO
9:00 a.m., Thursday,
April 16, 1959

HOW SHALL WE FORGE A STRATEGY FOR SURVIVAL?

Address by Senator Henry M. Jackson

Member, Senate Armed Services Committee
Senate Government Operations Committee
Chairman, Military Applications Subcommittee
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

For delivery
before the

NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE

Washington, D.C.

April 16, 1959
9:00 a.m.

General Harrold, faculty, members of the National War College and Industrial College of the Armed Forces, I am honored to have this opportunity to talk to you again. I thoroughly enjoy these occasions -- above all the question period which follows this opening statement. So I will immediately get down to the presentation of my theme.

The central issue of our time is this: Can a free society so organize its human and material resources as to outperform totalitarianism? Can a free people continue to identify new problems in the world and in space -- and respond, in time, with new ideas? I think you would agree with me that the answer to these two questions is now in doubt.

Only one out of every sixteen people in the world is an American. We occupy only 7 percent of the earth's land. Yet we carry the major burden of creating a world environment in which the democratic experiment can survive and prosper.

In performing this task, a host of new problems crowd upon us: the rising nationalisms in former colonial areas, the mounting pace of technology, exploding population growth, atomic weapons in the hands of more and more states. And complicating all of them is the increasing severity of the Sino-Soviet challenge.

The danger of a shooting war is clear.

We should expand military programs to develop the strength we need to win any war that might be forced upon us. We ought -- and I use the word deliberately, for it is fundamentally a moral issue -- we ought to do whatever is necessary to win and hold a decisive lead in the race for new weapons systems. And, together with our allies, we ought to develop strength adequate to protect the free world with limited means against limited

aggression.

It is absurd to say that we cannot afford to do these things. We cannot afford not to do them.

Could there have been anything more unimaginative than the defense budget ceiling of $14 billion in 1950 -- just before the Korean attack? In three years we had to treble our defense program, and we have maintained it at substantially that level ever since. Now even a $40 to $41 billion defense program isn't enough.

Yet our leadership has reverted to the arbitrary budget ceiling -- an ideal device to obscure the real requirements of survival.

It is high time that we ceased being victims of a budgetary fetish. We should determine our defense needs in the light of the threat. Then we must find economically sound ways to meet those needs -- by expanding our economy, and, if necessary, by providing more funds through additional taxes.

But today I wish to speak of the perils of the cold war. If we do what we ought to do militarily, we may not have a shooting war. In that case, the decisive struggle of our time will be fought on the battleground of the cold war. And that is precisely the battleground where Premier Khrushchev thinks he can beat us, plans to beat us, and will beat us unless we get to work.

What is this cold war all about? It is a war to determine what kind of world system is to be created on this planet, a communist world system or a world system in which free institutions can survive and flourish.

By outperforming us in one field after another, the Communists plan to demonstrate that their system represents the inevitable wave of the

future, and that our friends and allies have no realistic alternative except to join forces with them.

Loss of the cold war could be as final, and fatal, as defeat in an all-out war. And now we are losing the cold war, when we could be winning it.

Our own power as against that of the Communist bloc is in decline. We are losing ground in one field after another -- military power, economic strength, scientific capability, political influence, and psychological impact. We are going downhill at an accelerating rate -- which is the normal way of going downhill. And if that is a joke, it is a grim one.

The results of a continuation of this decline can be predicted with almost mathematical accuracy. The combination of growing Communist power and weakening American power will produce a chain reaction of defeats for the free world. Finally, as the culmination of retreat, after retreat, after retreat, we will stand at bay -- isolated and desperate.

There is no lack of good ideas as to what we have to do to reverse the tide of events. Over and over again lecturers here at the War College have said what we should do.

-- We should move faster to the invulnerable military deterrent, the Minuteman, and the Polaris missile system.

-- We should expand our economy at an annual rate of 5 or 6 percent, not 1 or 2 percent.

-- We should strengthen education across the board, especially in the sciences and foreign languages, but being careful not to neglect the social sciences, which are, so to speak, the sciences of the cold war.

-- We should increase our technical cooperation and development loan programs.

-- We should make a dramatic demonstration of our power to help the economically impoverished countries, and underwrite India's historic development program.

-- We should rally more of our best brains into public service.

We should be doing all these things -- and many others.

Committee after committee has proposed programs to fortify our position in the cold war. Indeed, for every new crisis we seem to get a new committee.

It is a formidable succession -- for example, the Finletter Committee, the Gray Committee, the Paley Commission, the Sarnoff Commission, the President's Committee on Scientists and Engineers, Citizens Advisers on Mutual Security, the Gaither Committee, the Draper Committee, the Boechenstein Committee -- not to mention the Committee on Economic Development and the study groups of the Rockefeller Brothers Fund.

Over and over again these committees warn that we are losing the cold war. Over and over again they recommend policies to stem the tide.

Their reports are not refuted. But neither are they acted upon. They are simply referred to some other committee for "study". After a decent interval, they are moved to some file drawer in the Pentagon or the State Department, there to await eventual transport to the National Archives and Records at 8th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.

And of what value are all the good ideas if nothing ever comes of them?

The truth is we know pretty well what we should do. The tragedy is we have not done it, we are not doing it, and we show few signs of doing it.

Why are the American people failing to pull themselves together and

act on the good ideas available? What is missing?

Certainly we do not lack a worthy cause -- freedom. Certainly we do not lack the capacity for hard work -- that is our tradition. Certainly we do not lack material resources -- we have plenty of them and we could easily have more. Certainly we do not lack brain-power -- we have an abundance of that.

What seems most to be missing is a coherent and purposeful national program that sets forth in simple terms what we have to do to survive, and why.

In wartime, there is a basic strategy to defeat the enemy. Our leaders know, and our people know, what they are trying to do, and what is demanded of them. This makes possible the marvelous unity and energy of wartime.

We have no comparable strategy for the cold war. Our leaders do not know, and the people surely do not know, what our purposes are and how we propose to achieve them. The harsh tasks of the cold war are glossed over with soothing cliches and platitudes. Our people are never told what is required of them. The Congress is presented with only bits and pieces of policies -- that give us no clear idea of what the Executive Branch is really trying to accomplish. And how can one expect to win any struggle unless one has a strategy for victory?

In this respect, the British in the 19th century were far ahead of us. The British leaders knew what they were doing and how they intended to do it. They were running a great empire and they had to maintain the freedom of the seas. Their people understood what was required -- they were indoctrinated in their duties from the cradle. Everyone knew the importance of a good education, the need to train for posts throughout the empire, the indispensability of a strong navy, and the significance of free trade.

During the 19th century the British people showed extraordinary energy and sustained a prodigious national effort.

By contrast, we seem to manage only sporadic effort. Come a crisis we may arouse ourselves to take emergency action. We appoint a Science Adviser to the President, we rush wheat to India, we improvise an airlift to Lebanon, we consent to a summit meeting.

But at no time are the vital energies of our people fully engaged. At no time are our people shown the 'whole package' of effort that is needed. At no time are the tasks of the cold war presented in terms that are meaningful to men at the work bench, to shopkeepers, to children in school, and to housewives.

In short -- we do not have a national strategy that elicits the interest, support and continuity of effort necessary for survival.

How can we get that kind of a national strategy?

More dynamic leadership would, of course, help. There is no substitute for brains and firm direction of government policy.

For example, when General Marshall reached the conclusion that we had to do something about Europe's economic plight in 1947, there was little problem in mobilizing talented people and public support to translate this idea into the highly successful European Recovery Program.

But it is not a satisfactory system that is completely dependent upon the personality of a single leader -- or a handful of leaders. The stakes are too great for us to bank on the all-pervasive wisdom of our top leadership. We should have sound methods for preparing a national strategy -- that will strengthen the hand of our leaders whatever their caliber, and make even an excellent leader that much more effective.

If we could get top-level officials to stay longer on the job, of course that would help.

I trust we can make some progress in this field, but we cannot expect spectacular results. A rapid turnover in top-level people is not simply the mark of the present Administration. It has been true of every Administration in recent times.

One thing I am sure would help -- better machinery for policy making.

Organization by itself cannot assure a strategy for victory in the cold war. But good organization can help, and poor organization can and does hurt. Let's face it: we are poorly organized.

Also, unlike some problems that confront us, that of organization is within the power of the Congress to tackle.

We now have an enormous Executive Branch and elaborate policy mechanisms: The Office of the President, the Cabinet, the National Security Council, and its two subsidiaries, the Operations Coordinating Board and the Planning Board. We have the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of the Secretary of State -- Departmental planning staffs, and hundreds of advisory boards, steering groups, interdepartmental committees, and special Presidential committees like the Draper Committee.

Yet this modern Hydra, with nine times nine heads, fails to produce what we need.

According to the chart it does the job:

The Planning Board of the National Security Council plans and proposes new policies and programs. These go for consideration to the heads of Departments who are members of the National Security Council. An agreed paper is approved by the National Security Council -- which serves as an advisory board for the President. The President decides. The policy

is then implemented under the watchful eye of the Operations Coordinating Board. And the President has a clear and consistent policy to spell out for the American people.

The procedure is pretty as a picture -- and that is what it is, a pretty picture on an organization chart. It has little or nothing to do with reality.

First, the NSC is not and by its nature cannot be an effective planning agency, except in the most Olympian sense.

The President may and should make the most basic strategic decisions -- such as the decision in 1941 to defeat Germany first and Japan second. In making such decisions the President no doubt needs the advice and counsel of an agency like the NSC. But neither the President nor the NSC and its Planning Board can make the detailed plans necessary to give effect to the basic strategic decisions. Planning of this sort requires the knowledge and experience of the expert, and also the resources and the environment of the Department having the main responsibility for the operations being planned. It is only in the Department concerned that the necessary conditions for extended creative planning work can be provided. And of course there must be cross-contacts and cross-stimuli between experts in the several Departments, at the level where planning is done.

The proper role of the NSC is to criticize and evaluate Departmental planning and proposals in light of the knowledge, interests, and possibly conflicting policies of other Departments. In this way what we call a coordinated view may be developed, and such a view may be very helpful to the President in making a clear determination of the executive will.

If, however, the official views of other Departments are expressed at the planning stage, as they will be if planning is undertaken at the NSC level, compromise and departmental jockeying begin too early. The result is that clear and purposeful planning becomes almost impossible. The effort to make the NSC a planning agency, therefore, has been a serious mistake in my view.

Second, and again in the nature of things, top level officers cannot thoroughly consider or think deeply about plans. They need to be confronted with the specific issues which grow out of an effort to harmonize a new policy with other policies. The so-called Planning Board can be very helpful by identifying such conflicts, defining them sharply, and presenting the distilled issues to the top level for decision. This is an essential function -- but it is not the first step in policy planning and should not be mixed up with the first step.

You know the typical week in the life of a Cabinet officer -- 7 formal speeches, 7 informal speeches, 7 hearings on the Hill, 7 official cocktail parties, 7 command dinner engagements. It is a schedule which leaves no time for the kind of reflection essential to creative planning. What they can do, should do, must do -- and all that they should be asked to do -- is to pass judgment on sharply defined policy issues.

Of course Cabinet members have the obligation to encourage and back the officers in their Department who are charged with policy planning. The responsibility of the policy planner should run clearly to his Departmental head. In this way staff planning can be geared into line decisions -- and the authority of the Departmental head can support and strengthen the hand of the planner.

But I am convinced that we will never get the kind of policy planning we need if we expect the top level officers to participate actively in the planning process. They simply do not have the time, and in any event they rarely have the outlook or the talents of the good planner. They cannot explore issues deeply and systematically. They cannot argue the advantages and disadvantages at length in the kind of give-and-take essential if one is to reach a solid understanding with others on points of agreement and disagreement.

Third, and largely for these reasons, a plan originating in the NSC will almost inevitably possess a fatal flaw; namely, a lack of internal consistency.

Good plans must be coherent; they must have sharp edges, for their purpose is to cut through a problem; their various elements must be harmonious and self-supporting. They must have the kind of logic, or, if you prefer, the kind of thematic unity which grows out of the uncompromising and uncompromised efforts of a creative mind. Compromise must come, but it should come after the planning process has been completed and as an adjustment of conflicts between a coherent plan and other coherent plans.

As you well know, NSC papers are in the end the result of compromises between different Departments. That is as it must be. The question is: What should the NSC seek to compromise? My answer is that the NSC should be presented with the most sharply defined policy issues and choices, not with papers which have already lost their cutting edge by a process of compromise at lower levels. When compromise begins at the planning stage, the issues which come to the NSC have already lost their sharpness, clarity and bite. The paper which is already inoffensive to every Department may be

easily approved, but it is also useless.

In short, plans which do not lead to sharp disputes at the NSC level are not good plans; they do not present the kind of issues which the top level ought to be called upon to decide in this hard slugging contest between the Sino-Soviet bloc and ourselves.

There is, I submit, a role for both Chiefs and Indians, and only confusion can result when the Indians try to do the work of compromise which is the job of Chiefs.

As it now functions, the NSC is a dangerously misleading facade. The American people and even the Congress get the impression that when the Council meets, fresh and unambiguous strategies are decided upon. This is not the case, though it ought to be the case. The NSC spends most of its time readying papers that mean all things to all men.

An NSC paper is commonly so ambiguous and so general that the issues must all be renegotiated when the situation to which it was supposed to apply actually arises. By that time it is too late to take anything but emergency action.

Fourth, national decision-making, as a result, becomes in fact a series of ad hoc, spur of the moment, crash actions.

Because the NSC does not really produce strategy, the handling of day-to-day problems is necessarily left to the Departments concerned. Each goes its own way because purposeful, hard-driving, goal-directed strategy, which alone can give a cutting edge to day-to-day tactical operations, is lacking.

Henry Kissinger has well described the kind of strategy which is the product of this process: "It is as if in commissioning a painting, a

patron would ask one artist to draw the face, another the body, another the hands, and still another the feet, simply because each artist is particularly good in one category." It is small wonder that the meaning of the whole is obscured both to the participants and to the public.

Indeed, and this is perhaps the most serious criticism, our present NSC system actually stultifies true creative effort in the Executive Branch.

Because planning is supposed to take place at the NSC level, the Departments are relieved of responsibility for identifying upcoming problems and for generating new ideas and are even discouraged from trying. The Indians are supposed merely to carry out existing policy, not to propose new policy. The result is that a vast reservoir of talent goes largely untapped.

Creative thought generally springs from daily concern with real problems, from the efforts of operators to operate. The new idea seldom comes from the man who turns his mind to a problem now and then; it comes from the man who is trying to lick a problem and finds that he can't lick it with the tools he has.

The present NSC process, furthermore, has reduced the cross-contacts and cross-stimuli between the Departments and services at the level where planning and operating take place or should take place.

One reason for this is that, in principle, no contacts are needed if policy planning is reserved to higher levels, and the lower levels are supposed to restrict themselves to carrying out instructions. Another reason may be that when planning is reserved to the highest levels, each Department considers that it must prepare to fight a battle in the NSC for

its special point of view. It, therefore, mobilizes itself for making its case in a manner that will support and show off the Departmental viewpoint to the best advantage. Contacts with other Departments are discouraged because they might provide them with arguments with which to rebut the views of one's own Department.

The bankruptcy of the present NSC technique is dramatized by the Administration's increasing reliance on "distinguished citizens committees" both to review past policies and also to recommend future action -- the Gaither Committee, the Draper Committee, the Boechenstein Committee -- and so on. These committees may come up with excellent ideas -- though this is probably the exception, not the rule. But few of the ideas are used.

Once such a temporary committee has presented its report, it is obviously in a poor position to fight its suggestions through to a decision. And the fresher its ideas, the greater the need for a hard fight to overcome vested interests in current policy. The fate of the Gaither Report is a classic case in point.

The sum of the matter is this: Our governmental processes do not produce clearly-defined and purposeful strategy for the cold war. Rather they typically issue in endless debate as to whether a given set of circumstances is in fact a problem -- until a crisis removes all doubt, and at the same time removes the possibility of effective action.

I grant that the cold war challenges our organizational ability to the limit. Yet think back to what we accomplished in World War II. With the stimulus of war, we put together a clearly defined national program of requirements and priorities. Then we set national goals to meet them. And

we exerted the needed effort. Between 1940 and 1944 we increased the real value of our gross national product by 55%, and while putting 11 million men into uniform and sending them all over the world, we were still able to increase the real consumption of goods and services by about 11% during that period.

Or think back to Korea. Between 1950 and 1953 we increased the real value of our GNP by 16%, and while multiplying defense expenditures three-fold, we increased the real consumption of goods and services by about 8%.

Can we organize such an effort without the stimulus of war? This is the heart problem of our time. Can a free society successfully organize itself to plan and carry out a national strategy for victory in the cold war?

I recently proposed to my colleagues in Congress that we make a full-dress study of this problem, with public hearings and a formal report. This would be the first Congressional review of government methods for formulating national policy in the cold war. The study would be conducted in a non-partisan manner. We would not be interested in destructive criticism but in constructive help.

The general questions that need consideration run something like this:

1. What is the present structure for formulating national policy?
2. What is it supposed to accomplish?
3. Is it doing it?
4. In what areas are there grave shortcomings?
5. Why is this the case?
6. What improvements should be made?

We need to find out why critical issues constantly fail to rise to the level of national decision -- in time. Experts down the line often see an issue, debate it, and write a paper about it -- then the problem gets lost

on its tortous movement upwards through the layers of bureaucracy.

Over and over again, vital questions never get before top officials in such a way that those officials have to face them, take responsibility for them, and decide them -- one way or the other.

Might there be some way in effect to force top-level response to specific ideas and issues? For example, why did it take a letter from the Congress as late as 1955 to induce the President to receive his first full-scale briefing on the status of our ballistic missile program?

In addition, we should ask this kind of question:

1. Does a case history of NSC 68 reveal useful lessons for the future? This paper, which proposed a major defense build-up, was worked out in 1949-1950, before the Korean attack, but it was signed by President Truman only after the attack. To my knowledge it is the first comprehensive statement of a national strategy.

2. Did the NSC fully consider the psychological impact of permitting the Russians to register scientific firsts in the intercontinental ballistic missile, in orbiting a satellite, and in sending a rocket beyond the moon? Was a decision taken that these scientific firsts did not matter?

I know there are some people who believe these scientific firsts do not matter. I think they are 100% wrong. The psychological impact of being the first to put a man on the moon cannot be underestimated. It will make an enormous difference to the in-between world and to the Russians as well -- if they do it first. It will even give us cause to doubt our own abilities!

3. Has the NSC considered and decided whether or not to make it a goal of national policy to substantially increase our gross national

product -- say from 1 or 2 percent to 5 or 6 percent?

The difference between a 3 percent and a 5 percent rate is staggering. In ten years -- one short decade -- our economy could turn out an extra $630 billion if we could step up our rate of growth from 3 percent to 5 percent.

If this goal has not been considered, who in the government prepares the alternative policy recommendations on this problem? And who actually makes the decision?

4. Has the NSC prepared a paper analyzing the implications of an arbitrary defense budget ceiling both for our defense program and for the strength of our political and diplomatic hand?

5. How much consideration has been given to the implications of the use of nuclear weapons in limited war? How has this matter been presented to the President?

6. Has the NSC prepared a paper analyzing the alternative ways this country could support and finance an increased defense program? Has such a paper been discussed by the Cabinet?

7. Has the NSC considered the relation of our present output of scientists and engineers to the future needs of defense and welfare, and made alternative recommendations to the President?

At this point, you could legitimately ask what constructive remedies the Congress can hope to recommend?

I believe there are at least two main areas where Congress could make helpful proposals:

In the first place, better ways can be found to stimulate deep, sus-

tained, creative thinking about the whole range of problems facing our nation and society.

In this connection several possibilities suggest themselves.

Policy Planning Staffs could be set up in each main Department, with a position, role and prestige like that of the Policy Planning Staff in the State Department in the Truman Administration.

Continuing staff relations could be organized between Defense and State, with the inclusion of other Departments as occasion warranted. These might center in joint meetings between Departmental policy planning staffs, or the directors of policy planning.

Continuing cross contacts could and should be organized at other levels, like that between State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Korean War.

The equivalent of a RAND organization might be organized for the Executive Branch, perhaps responsible to the Secretary of State.

An equivalent of a permanent Gaither Committee could be organized in the form of an Academy of National Policy, outside the government, but with access to classified information. The Academy could draw on experts in defense, in the sciences, social sciences, and humanities, and on leaders from private life. Insofar as possible the Academy's reports would be made public, as part of a continuing effort to develop an informed public opinion. In addition, the Academy could also prepare confidential reports for use of the government.

Unlike the Gaither and similar temporary committees, a permanent center would have a chance to build a reputation and tradition for responsible and helpful reports.

Secondly, better methods can be found to formulate and carry out a

clearly-defined and purposeful national program at the Presidential level.

Here again several possibilities suggest themselves:

The task of the NSC staff could be redefined as the identification and clarification of policy choices for the President and his principal advisors. Its purpose would not be to reach ambiguous compromises, but to sharpen policy choices in order to assist the President and the NSC to see the issues clearly and thus to decide them intelligently. This change would recognize, in organizational terms, that the proper role of the President and his advisors is to make choices between clearly stated and sharply defined proposals.

The central role of the Secretary of State could be affirmed by giving him primary responsibility for the initial presentation to the Council of the NSC papers in which policy choices are defined.

The NSC staff could be reorganized, and composed of the heads of the Departmental policy planning staffs, responsible to their Department chiefs. That kind of a staff would be better prepared to define issues and thus to prepare the way for intelligent decision-making at the top level than the present staff which is responsible to an independent Director.

In short, NSC staff papers could be shaped to force the careful weighing of alternative courses of action by NSC members, and to force the Chiefs of Departments and the President to make the choices between alternatives that they should make.

Let me say at this point:

We could develop excellent machinery and come up with all kinds of fine proposals -- but if these proposals never reach the top level for decision, then we would be no better off than at present. We would be right back with the Gaither Report. I am not sure what the full answer is. As I have indi-

cated, this aspect of the problem must be thoroughly considered by our Congressional inquiry. I am sure, however, of what we need and are looking for -- a national policy-making system that by its nature gets critical issues, sharply defined, up to the highest level where a conclusion can be reached on them -- in good time.

Finally, given the kind of national strategy I have been talking about, the Operations Coordinating Board would come into its own. There is a need for such an agency. The committee headed by William Jackson, way back in 1953, had a good idea. But the coordination of operations presupposes a guiding national strategy and the OCB cannot coordinate because this precondition is lacking. It cannot direct until it receives strategic directives. It cannot wield the baton because there is no orchestra, only a collection of anarchic musicians each playing his own hot licks on his own instrument with his own music.

Of course, a new and better organization of itself is not going to be the whole answer. At best, organization can only help.

You know well enough how much we need vigorous and creative national leadership. Most of you know from personal experience the importance in high places of a hospitality to ideas. And there must be a recognition of the fundamental problem.

Perhaps I am wrong, but I think our fundamental problem is that we do not have a national strategy for victory in the contest with world Communism.

At this point in our history, I believe there is no more important contribution that the Senate could make than to prod, poke, and irritate the

Executive Branch into developing such a strategy and organizing our government for that task.

And I do know this, and with the immodesty becoming a Senator I will assert it with all the force I have: without such a clear strategy, it will prove increasingly difficult to get the public and Congressional support that is the essential underpinning of the adequate, purposeful, continuing action on which victory in the cold war depends.

It is far more difficult to generate the enthusiasm for the long drawn-out efforts of the cold war than for the dramatic clashes of a hot war. It is on this fact that Mr. Khrushchev is heavily banking. All the more important, therefore, is the formulation of a clear and understandable strategy for victory.

In conclusion, let me just say this:

We fail to act on the good ideas available. We fritter away our strength on secondary matters. We fiddle trifling tunes while the world burns. But back of all that -- still the true glory of a free society is its central conviction: The world can be made a decent place to live in -- a world of peace, material well-being, justice and freedom -- a world "in which no individual is lost and none is forgotten."

Free men are the real champions of the future. We are the bearers of the truly revolutionary idea of our age -- that the quest for human welfare and the quest for human liberty are one and the same quest.

The truth is that to every threat of defeat there has always come the resolute response of free men -- "It shall not be."

This can be so again, as we in our time bend our efforts to building the decent world for which we stand -- knowing that humanity's hope depends upon it.

COPY

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE DIRECTOR

Attached is a copy of Senator Jackson's Saturday speech to the American Society of International Law. He intends to introduce his bill to create an "Academy of National Policy" within the next week to ten days.

Also attached is a newspaper clipping indicating Senator Humphrey's intention to establish a Senate-House Committee on National Strategy and Security.

/S/
LAWRENCE R. HOUSTON
General Counsel

4 May 1959
(DATE)

Routed to DDCI

COPY

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FORM NO. 237 Replaces Form 30-4 which may be used. (40)

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